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Abstract
This analysis looks at the best way to deal with the proliferation of fake drugs, and considers
the conflict that arises when government agencies aim to reduce the harmful effects of the
fake medicine trade while the pharmaceutical firms seek profit maximization. It is
demonstrated that the pharmaceutical industry might wish to encourage better law
enforcement rather than improved information policies, even when the latter would lead to a
greater reduction in the fake drug trade.
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The spread of fake and substandard drugs is a major problem in both developed and 
developing countries. Evidence suggests that they can lead to therapeutic failure or drug 
resistance; in some cases, they led to death. The WHO (2006), for example, reports that 
during a meningitis epidemic in Niger in 1995, more than 50,000 people were inoculated with 
fake vaccines resulting in 2500 deaths. In one of the few reports that present quantitative data 
collected in a controlled and methodical manner, Shakoor, Taylor and Behrens (1997) 
indicate that 36.5% of the samples of chloroquine and selected antibacterials from Nigeria 
and Thailand were substandard with respect to pharmacopoeial limits. Dondrom et al. (2004) 
attempt to assess the prevalence of counterfeit antimalarial drugs in Southeast Asia, and they 
observe that 53% of the tablet packs purchased in their study were labelled as manufactured 
by an authorized firm but did not contain any active ingredient. Kelesidis et al. (2007) review 
the existing literature on counterfeit antimicrobial drugs and conclude that the problem has 
titanic proportions and similarly devastating effects. In fact, fake drugs are almost certainly 
detrimental to public health, they undermine public confidence in medicines and, in addition, 
counterfeiting damages the pharmaceutical supply system and the benefits that this might 
generate in terms of research and new products. Morris and Stevens (2006) highlight a 
number of factors that potentially encourage the fake-drug-trade, the foremost of these being 
the fact that counterfeiting is a lucrative criminal business. Hence, the Declaration of Rome 
(WHO, 2006a), art. 2, states that, “Because of its direct impact on health, counterfeiting 
medicines should be combated and punished accordingly.” 
  In order to combat counterfeit drugs, the World Health Organization launched the 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) in February 2006. 
The main objective of IMPACT is to stop the production and trading of fake medicines. 
IMPACT is a partnership of international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
enforcement agencies, pharmaceutical manufacturing associations and drug and regulatory 
authorities. The inclusion of all concerned parties is consistent with the recommendations of 
the WHO (WHO, 1999). Given that counterfeiting damages both public health and the profits 
of the pharmaceutical industry, the collaboration of manufacturers and public authorities 
seems logical. However, profit maximization may not necessarily go hand in hand with a 
reduction in the counterfeit drugs trade.  
This paper develops a simple model of vertical product differentiation and price 
competition between an authorized pharmaceutical firm and a counterfeit producer, and 
considers the possibility of Government intervention through either improved law 
enforcement or an “information policy”, which consists of providing potential patients with 
the means for distinguish between fake and genuine drugs. The lack of information on 
substandard drugs is a major source of concern and this has been considered by other authors. 
For instance, Cockburn et al. (2005) analyse this phenomenon and suggest that 
pharmaceutical companies do not publicize the problem due to the belief that it would harm 
sales and brand-name products. This paper takes a different approach, and it is shown that the 
pharmaceutical industry and public agencies aimed at fighting counterfeit trade might have 
different preferences with respect to the best policy option. In fact, though all agents agree on 
the main objective, which is the reduction of counterfeiting, strengthening the legal 
disincentive to produce and distribute counterfeit drugs might simply benefit profit 
maximization rather than simply leading to a reduction in counterfeit products. 
 
 
   2
2. Competition between pharmaceutical firms and counterfeit drug producers 
 
 
Two pharmaceutical firms compete in the market for a specific drug. Firm 1 is assumed to be 
the producer of a fake drug, whereas Firm 2 has been authorized to produce the same drug 
with a certified quality standard. The product of Firm 1 is substandard with respect to 
pharmaceutical quality and testing limits and thus, the trade of the counterfeit drug is socially 
undesirable. This is clearly a strong assumption, provided that many persons have no access 
to genuine drugs and it could be beneficial for them to face the risk of prejudicial side-effects 
instead of passively observe the course of their diseases. However, the aim of this paper is to 
show the existence of a conflict of interests in the fight against fake drugs, even when it is 
assumed that all counterfeit drugs are substandard and detrimental to public health. Hence, 
products are differentiated by their “perceived quality”, which is related to the capacity of 
individuals to distinguish between counterfeit and brand drugs. Explicitly, the main 
difference between fake and genuine drugs is their intrinsic quality in terms of principal 
active ingredients, but the potential recipients of these drugs are not always in a position to 
judge since they may be illiterate. For example, fake drugs are sold and packaged as if they 
were the genuine article. Let  2 1 s s ≤  be the perceived quality of product 1 and 2, respectively. 
Firms compete in prices and hence, Firm 1 must sell its product at a lower price with respect 
to Firm 2 in order to obtain a positive demand,  2 1 p p < . Provided that the counterfeiter faces 
neither research costs nor quality controls, it is assumed that production costs are higher for 
Firm 2. For the sake of simplicity, we thus assume that the marginal cost faced by Firm 1 is 
lower than the marginal cost of Firm 2,  2 1 c c < . 
  Each potential patient can buy just one unit of a given drug or, alternatively, nothing; 
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where  2 , 1 = i  and ϑ  can be interpreted as the preference for quality, which might depend on 
the level of income or the risk-propensity, for example. The value of ϑ  is bounded from both 
below and above,  ϑ ϑ ϑ < < , where heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences is constrained 
by  . 2ϑ ϑ <  The previous assumption is justified by a common inclination for high quality 
and effective drugs. In particular, consumers’ preferences are uniformly distributed in the 
interval( ) ϑ ϑ, , and the total population is normalized to one. Each patient is indifferent 







1 2 ϑ ,        ( 2 )  
 


















2 ϑ .       ( 4 )    3
 
 
Firms choose the price  i p  in order to maximize profits 
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This simple optimisation problem is solved by each firm and implies the equilibrium prices 
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As can be observed, increased differential of perceived quality lowers the demand and profits 
of the unauthorized Firm 1, whereas the increased costs differential  c ∆  results in lower 
profits for the authorized Firm 2. In addition, consumer demand might be at a corner for 
either fake drugs or real drugs depending on the relationship between quality and cost 
differentials. In particular, when the perceived quality differential, weighted with quality 
preference, is higher than the cost differential,  
 
0 ) 2 ( 1 = ⇒ ∆ ≥ − ∆ D c s ϑ ϑ .       ( 1 2 )  
 
Conversely, sufficiently high cost differential implies that consumer demand for genuine 
drugs is equal to zero, 
0 ) 2 ( 2 = ⇒ ∆ ≤ − ∆ D c s ϑ ϑ .       ( 1 3 )  
 




3. Effects of Government intervention 
 
It is now assumed that a Government agency intervenes in the market in order to curtail 
counterfeit trade. Two different policies are considered here, namely the enforcement of 
property rights laws and the consequent prosecution of Firm 1, and an “information policy”.   4
While the prosecution of Firm 1 results in increased costs of production, provided that Firm 1 
can internalise the expected cost of sanctions, the “information policy” is aimed at providing 
individuals with the means for distinguishing between fake and authentic drugs. In other 
words, 
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where  LE  stands for improved Low Enforcement policy and I  for Information policy. 
Government agency intervention affects both counterfeit pharmaceutical trade and firms’ 
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Reduction of counterfeit pharmaceutical trade is proportional to the efficiency with which the 
enforcement of law affects production costs, and it depends inversely on the perceived quality 
























   (17) 
 
In other words, the profits of the authorized firm increase with improved law enforcement. 
  Another possibility for the Government agency consists of altering the perceived 
quality of counterfeit drugs by providing citizens with adequate information. The effects of 















































   (19) 
 
As in the previous situation, Government intervention both reduces fake drug trade and 
results in increased profits for Firm 2. 
  The choice of the Government agency between these two alternative policies crucially 
depends on the level of the production cost differential, the perceived quality differential and 
the efficacy in affecting the cost structure or the consumers’ perception of quality. Obviously, 
Firm 2 is also interested in combating fake drugs, due to the possibility of monetary benefits 
as shown in (17) and (19), but while the Government agency aims to reduce the diffusion of 
harmful medicines, Firm 2 is moved by profit maximization. In order to highlight the 
potential conflict of interests between Firm 2 and the Government agency, it is initially 
assumed that the agency is indifferent to intervention through law enforcement or by 
providing individuals with adequate information. 
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Assumption 1 ensures that one additional dollar spent on either law enforcement or diffusion 
of information has the same marginal utility in terms of reduction of counterfeit drug trade. 
Under A1, it is interesting to analyse what the preferred policy for Firm 2 will be. 
Substituting A1 into (19) and comparing with (17) it is possible to obtain 
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Proposition 1. Under A1, Firm 2 prefers improved law enforcement in order to maximize 
profits when  c s ∆ < − ∆ 3 ) 2 ( ϑ ϑ ; the firm is indifferent between the two policies when 
, 3 ) 2 ( c s ∆ = − ∆ ϑ ϑ  and prefers information diffusion otherwise. 
 
Proof. The proof follows from the effects of Government agency intervention under A1, see 
(17) and (19). 
 
Proposition 1 states that when  c s ∆ < − ∆ 3 ) 2 ( ϑ ϑ , Firm 2 faces an incentive to encourage 
improved law enforcement. The interest of this conclusion relies on the reality of the 
assumption regarding the relationship between quality and cost differentials. For example, 
counterfeit firms are succeeding in fooling consumers by using official-looking packaging, 
while, of course, the production costs are much higher for authorized firms. It should be 
noted that Firm 2 prefers improved law enforcement even when (13) holds, that is, when the 
demand for real drugs is equal to zero.  
  Assumption 1 can be relaxed in order to show the existence of a “region of conflict” 
when the Government agency has a preference for the information policy. 
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A2 states that the marginal utility of the information policy in terms of reduction of fake drug 
trade is equal to the marginal utility of law enforcement plus a positive parameter ξ  and 
hence, the Government agency prefers to invest in providing information about drugs quality. 
  Under A2, the preferences of Firm 2 are now analysed. Substituting A2 into (19) and 
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Proposition 2. Under A2 and for * ξ ξ < , the Government agency prefers to fight against 
counterfeit drug trade via the information policy, whereas Firm 2 prefers improved law 
enforcement in order to affect the cost structure of Firm 1. 
 
Proof. The proof follows from a simple comparison between equations (17) and (19) under 
A2 and (21). 
 
 
A corollary of Proposition 2 is that when the information policy is much more effective in 
reducing counterfeit trade with respect to improved law enforcement ( * ξ ξ ≥ ), both the 
Government agency and Firm 2 agree on the policy to be adopted.. 
 
Corollary. When  * ξ ξ ≥  both the Government agency and Firm 2 prefer the information 
policy in order to combat fake drugs.  
 
It should be noted that the above conclusion follows from the different objectives of the two 
agents being considered. In particular, the Government agency aims to reduce the quantity of 
fake drugs in the market, while Firm 1 seeks profit maximization. A limitation of this 
approach is that Assumption 1 and 2 mean that it is possible to draw conclusions without 
explicitly considering policy costs. In other words, it is important to bear in mind that the 
different levels of efficiency of the two policies is affected by costs, though this is not 
explicitly stated in A1 and A2. In order to assess the effects of real strategies to combat 
counterfeit drugs, however, differential efficiency should be assessed and hence, it would be 






Fake medicines might be detrimental to public health and therefore, it is necessary to develop 
strategies to combat counterfeit trade. All of the parties concerned, from Government 
agencies to pharmaceutical manufacturers and consumers, are usually encouraged to take part 
in the development of plans for reducing this phenomenon. However, this paper shows that a 
conflict between agencies aimed at reducing counterfeit trade and firms motivated by profit 
maximization might arise. In particular, when the differential of perceived quality between 
fake and genuine drugs is low and counterfeit producers face very low costs of production, 
pharmaceutical firms might encourage improved law enforcement rather than information 
policies, even when the latter option would result in a greater reduction in fake drug trade. 
Therefore, caution should be exercised when including the pharmaceutical industry in task 
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